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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether or not the District Court erred in ruling that 
an assignment of a beneficial interest in a Deed of Trust did not 
constitute a conveyance of real property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 18th day of May, 1977, Appellant South Sanpitch 
Company, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
Hoffbuher Redi-Mix, Inc., (hereinafter "Redi-Mix") for the 
purchase of ten (10) acres of unimproved real property, which 
ten acres is the subject matter of this lawsuit. (Ex. 4) Said 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was not recorded nor was any notice 
of contract recorded with respect thereto. 
Redi-Mix thereafter executed and recorded a Quitclaim 
Deed dated the 12th day of November, 1980 to T. P. Family 
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership, conveying 6,696.85 acres 
included in which was the subject 10 acres being purchased by 
South Sanpitch (Ex. 1). 
On or about the 28th day of August, 1981, T. P. Family 
Partnership executed and recorded a Deed of Trust to D Land Title 
as Trustee and Margaret A. Gunterman as Beneficiary, encumbering 
220 acres and which included the subject ten acres (Ex. 3). 
After all payments were satisfied with respect to the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract between South Sanpitch and Redi-Mix, 
South Sanpitch sought and eventually obtained from Gunterman a 
request for a partial reconveyance on the subject ten acres. 
Pursuant to Gunterman1s request, a Deed of Partial 
Reconveyance was executed by D Land Title as Trustee on December 
16, 1983. (Ex. 5) 
Following the execution of said Deed of Partial 
Reconveyance but prior to its recording, Gunterman executed and 
recorded an assignment to Daniel Pack of her beneficial interest 
in the Trust Deed from T. P. Family Partnership as Grantor 
(Ex. 2). 
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The Deed of Partial Reconveyance was recorded on May 
29, 1984. (Ex. 5) 
Approximately one year later, on April 2, 1985, South 
Sanpitch commenced this action believing it necessary to quiet 
title to the subject ten acres due to the execution and 
recordation of the Assignment of the Promissory Note secured by 
the Deed of Trust prior to the recording of the Deed of Partial 
Reconveyance. 
South Sanpitch, prior to trial and without hearing, 
obtained the relief sought in their Complaint in that they 
obtained an order quieting title to the subject ten acres through 
stipulations with all necessary Defendants. The Complaint was 
pursued to trial as to Respondent D Land Title Company, merely 
for the purpose of obtaining attorneys fees as a form of damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly found that South Sanpitch 
was not damaged despite the fact that the Deed of Partial 
Reconveyance was not timely recorded because said Deed of Partial 
Reconveyance, when recorded, transferred legal title to the 
subject ten acres and released all other interests in and to the 
same. 
The assignment by Margaret A. Gunterman of her note and 
beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust did not constitute a 
conveyance of real property. The Trustee's legal title in the 
property was not changed or reduced because of such assignment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ASSIGNMENT OF A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN A 
DEED OF TRUST IS NOT A CONVEYANCE OF REAL 
PROPERTY. 
In August, 1981 T. P. Family Partnership conveyed to D 
Land Title as Trustee all its right, title and interest in and to 
the subject ten acres. Had there been a Trustee's Sale pursuant 
to a foreclosure of the Deed of Trust, the Trustee would have 
conveyed to the purchaser at such Trustee1s Sale the same right, 
title and interest which had vested in the Trustee at the time of 
the original conveyance by T. P. Family Partnership to D Land 
Title as Trustee, subject only to the liens and encumbrances of 
record affecting the property at the time of the original 
conveyance to the Trustee. 
Section 57-1-28(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended states that: 
The Trustee's Deed shall operate to convey to 
the purchaser, without right of redemption, 
the Trustee *s title gtnd all right, title, 
interest and claim of the trustor and his" 
successors in interest and"" of all persons 
claiming by, through, or under them in and to 
the property sold, including all~lTuch right, 
title, interest and claim in and to such 
property acquired by the Trustor or his 
successors in trust subsequent to the 
execution of the Trust Deed. (Emphasis added) 
The title vested in a Trustee of a Deed of Trust is 
determined by the title and interest of the Trustor and his 
successors in interest or persons claiming by or through Trustor 
or his successors and is not affected by the acts of the 
beneficiary to such Deed of Trust. 
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The assignment of a beneficial interest in a Deed of 
Trust is not an encumbrance. The Deed of Trust is itself an 
encumbrance and the acts of the beneficiary of such Deed of Trust 
does not create a separate encumbrance or a lien which would in 
any way affect the title held by the Trustee. 
Assuming that the trust property had been sold at a 
Trustee's Sale, the purchase at such sale would not have been 
subject to the beneficiary's assignment of her interest in the 
Deed of Trust because such assignment did not represent an 
encumbrance or a lien. Even if the assignment were deemed to be 
a properly recorded lien, it was not recorded before the Deed of 
Trust itself and thus it would be inferior to the title held by 
the Trustee and eliminated at the time of the Trustee's Sale. 
-k * *The cestui que trust or beneficiary in a 
Deed of Trust given as security for a debt 
has no title to, or estate in, the property 
covered by the deed or at least he has no 
legal title or ownership and it has been held 
that he has no equitable title,* * * He has 
only a lien or a secured chose in action, and 
he has an interest only to the extent that he 
can cause the Trustee to sell the land and 
apply the proceeds to payment of the secured 
debt. Such interest is personal property. 59 
C.J.S. Mortgages, §196, pgs. 257-258. 
No disposition of the beneficial interest of the Trust 
Deed could affect title to the property and title to the property 
remained in the Trustee under said Trust Deed. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH RECORDING STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THIS CASE BECAUSE IT AFFORDS PROTECTION ONLY 
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OF REAL PROPERTY 
WITHOUT NOTICE. 
Appellant argues that under the recording statute Pack 
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as assignee of an obligation secured by the Deed of Trust in 
question was not affected or bound by the subsequently-recorded 
partial reconveyance because he was a purchaser in good faith for 
value without notice of the partial reconveyance. Section 
57-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is cited as 
authority for this position. However, upon closer examination of 
the statute it is clear that protection from unrecorded 
instruments is only afforded purchasers of the real property 
involved. Section 57-3-3 reads: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter 
made, which shall be recorded as provided in 
this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for 
valuable consideration of the same • real 
estate, or any portion thereof, where" his own 
conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
(Emphasis added) 
Section 57-3-3 does not apply because Pack was not a 
purchaser of real estate but was merely the purchaser of an 
obligation secured by the Deed of Trust in question and the 
assignee of the beneficial interest therein; the interest 
acquired being an interest in personal property only. 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages, §196, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court did not err in finding that the Appellant 
was not damaged by the untimely recording of the partial 
reconveyance because the prior recorded assignment of beneficial 
interest did not constitute a conveyance of real property or an 
encumbrance affecting title. Title remained in the name of the 
Trustee unaffected by said assignment of the beneficial interest 
in the Deed of Trust. 
~ 6 ~ 
Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that the 
Court affirm the judgment of the Lower Court• 
DATED this 5th day of September, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CEAMBERLA] 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
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Brief of Respondent were mailed to Messrs. Brent D. Young and 
Jerry L. Reynolds, Ivie & Young, Attorneys for Appellant, 48 
North University Avenue, P.O. Box 672, Provo, Utah (84603), by 
U.S. Regular Mail, postage prepaid, on this75th day of September, 
1986. 
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57-1-28 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Pa>ment of bid — - Trustee's 
deed delivered to purchaser — Recitals — Effect (1) The purchaser at the sale 
shall [forthwith] pay the price bid as directed b\ the trustee and upon leeeipt of 
payment^ the trustee shall execute and deliver hib deed to such purchaser. The 
trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the requirements of fth4s 
ftefe] Sections 57-149 through 57-1-36 relating to the exercise of the power of sale 
and sale of the property described therein, including recitals concerning any mail-
ing, personal delivery^ and publication of the notice of default, any mailing and 
the publication and posting of the notice of sale, and the conduct of sale[7 im4 s«eh]: 
These recitals [skatt] constitute prima-facie evidence of such compliance and are 
conclusive evidence [thereof] in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers 
for value and without notice. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right 
of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest^ and claim of the trus-
tor and his successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under 
them, in and to the property sold, including all such right, title, interest; and claim 
in and to such property acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest subse-
quent to the execution of the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 10; 1985, ch. 
68, § 2. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposition. 
Duties of trustee* responsibilities in order to assist certain 
A trustee under trust deed has an affirma- interest holders at the expense of others. 
tive duty to uphold his statutory responsibili- Randall v. Valley Title (1984) 681 P 2d 219. 
ties, and may not ignore those 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obligations secured — 
Reinstatement — Cancellation of recorded notice of default (1} Whenever all 
or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust deed has? 
prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become due or been declared 
due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation secured 
by the trust deed, including a default in the pa\ meat of interest or of any Install-
ment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with 
the terms of [sue)*] the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance^ or 
advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms of such obligation or 
of such trust deed, the trustor or his successor in interest in the trust property 
or any part thereof or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance 
of record thereon or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time 
within three months of the filing for record of notice of default under such trust 
deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, [e^ otherwise at a^y time prior to 
the entry of the 4eeree of foreclosure;] may pay to the beneficiary or his successor 
in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of such tiust deed [a^d 
the obligation secured thereby] (including costs and expenses actually incurred in 
enforcing the terms of such obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attor-
ney's fees actually incurred) other than such portion of the piincipal as would not 
then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore exist-
ing and, thereupon^ all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed 
or discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be 
and remain in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner [herein-
above] provided in Subsection (1), the beneficialy, oi his assignee, shall, on demand 
of any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to him 
154 
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57-3-3 REAL ESTATE 
Omission of amount of debt in mortgage 
or in record thereof (including general 
description without stating amount) as 
affecting validity of mortgage, its opera-
tion as notice, or its coverage with respect 
to debts secured, 145 A. L. R. 369. 
Record as charging one with construc-
tive notice of provisions of extrinsic in-
strument referred to in the recorded in-
strument, 82 A. L. R. 412. 
Record of deed or contract for convey-
ance of one parcel with covenant or ease-
ment affecting another parcel owned by 
grantor as constructive notice to subse-
quent purchaser or encumbrancer of latter 
parcel, 16 A. L. Rt 1013. 
Record of deed to cotenant as notice to 
other cotenants of adverse character of 
grantee's possession, 82 A. L. R. 2d 5. 
Record of instrument which comprises 
or includes an interest or right that is not 
a proper subject of record, 3 A. L. R, 2d 
577. 
Record of instrument without acknowl-
edgment or insufficiently acknowledged as 
notice, 59 A. L. R. 2d 1299. 
Rights as between purchaser of timber 
under unrecorded instrument and subse-
quent vendee of land, 18 A. L. R. 2d 1162. 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.—Every conveyance of real estate 
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title 
shall be void as against any snbsequent purchaser in good faith and foi 
a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
History: B. S. 1898 & C. X.. 1907, § 2001; Words and pnrases defined. 
C. £ . 1917, §4901 ;"_B. S. 1933 & C 
78-3-3 
1943, 
ESect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on 
certain tract of land, owner executed 
deed to grantee on property not included 
in mortgage, which deed was not recorded, 
decree in action to foreclose mortgage on 
tract of land, including part conveyed to 
grantee, was not binding on grantee who 
was not party to such action. Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 U. 156, 
48 P. 2d 480, 102 A. L. B. 819. 
A judgment lien is subordinate and in-
ferior to a deed which predated it whether 
recorded after such judgment or whether 
not recorded at all. Kartchner v. State 
Tax Comm., 4 TJ. (2d) 3S2, 294 P. 2d 790. 
Priority. 
Innocent purchaser for value without 
notice of previous conveyance, who first 
records his conveyance, take3 preference 
over prior unrecorded conveyance. Mc-
Garry v. Thompson, 114 TJ. 442, 201 P. 2d 
288, involving priority as between assign-
ments of application to appropriate un-
appropriated public water under 73-3-18, 
citing Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Smith, 2 U. 
39, affd. 104 TJ. S. 428, 26 L. Ed. 802. 
Later in time but prior recorded first 
mortgage took precedence over purchase 
money mortgage where mortgagee had 
no notice of the purchase money mortgage. 
Kemp v. Zions Pirst Nat. Bank, 24 U. 
(2d) 288, 470 P. 2d 390. 
This section does not define what i, 
meant by the word "recorded." Boyer v 
Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co,, 71 
TJ. 1, 287 P. 188. 
Mortgage lien is included in term "con 
veyance" as used in this section, mort 
gagee is purchaser, and law of priority o 
record applies to mortgages. Federal Lam 
Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 TJ. 156, 4 
P. 2d 480, 102 A. L, R. 819. 
CoUateral References. 
Vendor and Purchaser<£=>233. 
92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 345. 
Failure to record, 56 Am. Jur. 2d 437 € 
seq., Records and Recording Laws § 15 
et seq. 
Agreement between real estate ownei 
restricting use of property as within coi 
templation of recording~laws, 4 A r L . I 
2d 1419. 
Presumption a ad burden of proof i 
regards good faith and consideration "c 
part of purchaser or one taking encufi 
branee subsequent to unrecorded conve, 
ance or encumbrance, 107 A. L. R. 502. 
Purchase-money mortgage as within pr 
vision of statute defeating or postponir 
lien of unrecorded or unfiled mortgag 
137 A. L. R. 571, 108 A. L. R. 116$: 
Right of one otherwise protected by r 
cording law against prior unreco-rd^<Ude< 
or mortgage as affected by fact that^ i 
or part of the consideration was unpa 
at the time he received notice, actual 
constructive, of the prior instrument^-li 
A. L. R. 163. 
348 
APPENDIX p . i i 
